There is something strange about the concept of rights. We say that humans have rights, but we also say that corporations have rights. Environmentalists insist that forests have rights of their own. Animal rights philosophers argue that sentience, not membership in a species, is the relevant threshold. Kings once claimed rights bestowed directly by God. The people who overthrew them claimed rights that were bestowed by nature. We can extend rights to individuals and to groups, to nation states, to those yet to be born, to those who are dead, and even to artificial intelligences.
It seems difficult to find a single thread connecting all these instances. If rights are linked to rational agency, as Kant argued, then animals cannot have them. If rights arise from sentience, as utilitarians propose, then corporations cannot have them. If rights are granted only by positive law, then talk of fundamental human rights violated by states that refuse to codify them becomes incoherent. Every attempt to locate a single origin for rights, whether in reason, sentience, divine decree, or legal enactment, succeeds in explaining some cases while failing to account for others. The ontology of rights resists unification.
Is such unification impossible? If we tried to find an underlying substance that generates rights, I think we would never succeed. But suppose instead we ask what all rights actually do in practice. On the surface, rights seem to be constituted by some property present in the nature of their bearer. Upon examination, however, that turns out to be secondary. Across the full variety of cases, every right has one thing in common: it makes demands on someone. A right is a way of organizing obligations.
To say that an entity has a right is to say that certain obligations exist, distributed among certain individuals, oriented toward that entity. Consequently, it is not necessary for that entity to be human, to be sentient, or even to exist at all. The right does not exist above and beyond the obligations; it is constituted by the obligations themselves.
Take a child’s right to life. This right is constituted by the obligation of his family to protect him, the obligation of strangers to intervene when the child is in danger, the obligation of enemies not to harm him, and, in a modern state, the obligation of law enforcement officers to investigate threats against him and of medical professionals to treat him in emergencies. If we remove these and other obligations, the right to life loses all substance. Nothing remains, no residual metaphysical property called “a right” that persists once every obligation has been subtracted.
Or consider the right to property. When we say an owner has a right to her possessions, we are saying that everyone else is obligated not to steal from her, not to vandalize what she owns, and not to interfere with its legal disposition. Officials are obligated to enforce these prohibitions. Courts are obligated to adjudicate disputes fairly. The right to property refers to this entire constellation of obligations.
The same applies to more complex cases. The right of a state to tax its subjects is constituted by the obligation of those subjects to pay what they owe and to refrain from obstructing tax officials. A corporation’s right to contract is constituted by the obligation of legislators not to impose arbitrary restrictions on that corporation’s ability to enter agreements, the obligation of judges to adjudicate contract disputes impartially, the obligation of officials to execute judgments fairly. In every case, what we call a right turns out to be a collection of obligations, bound together by their orientation toward a common beneficiary, which could be any entity.
Rights can be ascribed to humans, deities, corporations, and nature not because all these entities share some property that generates rights, like sentience or reason, but because obligations can be organized around any of them.
A natural question that arises is: if rights are simply a way of organizing obligations, why bother with the concept at all? The language of rights invites overreach, with new rights proclaimed whenever someone wishes to press a demand. Why not speak only of obligations and dispense with rights entirely?
The answer is that the language of rights performs a function that the language of obligations alone cannot: it creates an incentive.
An obligation is something imposed on you. It is a demand, a constraint on your freedom. When we tell someone they are obligated not to steal, we are telling them what they cannot do.
A right reverses the direction. It addresses the beneficiary. When we say someone has a right to their property, we are telling them what they are owed. We are addressing them as persons who stand to receive a benefit.
The advantage of this reversal is that it recruits self-interest into the service of moral order, helping to make that order sustainable. No one is naturally enthusiastic about bearing obligations. But everyone is enthusiastic about possessing rights. When obligations are organized through rights, every person who benefits from the system—which is to say, everyone—acquires a stake in its maintenance. I honor my obligation not to steal from you not out of abstract moral devotion but because I want my own right to property upheld. I support the system of obligations that constitutes your right to life because the same system constitutes mine and those I care about.
Rights thus represent an extraordinary moral innovation. They take the raw material of obligations, the “thou shalts” and “thou shalt nots” that every social order requires, and repackage it in a form that generates its own support.
This may seem deflationary, and in a sense it is. We are rejecting the intuition that rights are irreducibly normative, or that they descend from heaven, or that they are woven into the fabric of rational nature. We are recognizing them as they are: a way of organizing obligations.
Continue Reading:
→ Michael Huemer: Nature of Knowledge, Foundations of Morality (podcast)
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→ Universal Open Textbook Initiative — World’s largest repository of free, multilingual textbooks.
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